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Payout (dividend) policy has been a controversial topic for decades. Theoretical and 
empirical  literature  has  listed  dozens  of  factors  that  could  affect  firm’s  payout 
decisions. Current paper analyses the influence of financial performance on firms’ 
payout decisions based on a large sample of Estonian companies and covers the 
financial and economic crises period of 2008-2009. The results indicate that past 
financial performance indicators are poor predictors of future dividends (measured 
both  by  payout  ratio  and  the  value  of  dividends).  The  connection  between  the 
dividends paid and future earnings of the firm turned out to be remarkably stronger, 
i.e. dividends seem to possess some predictive power. 
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In year 2000 a unique tax reform was carried out in Estonia, the aim of which was to 
replace earned profit taxation with distributed profit taxation
2. Since year 2000 firms 
must  pay  income  tax  only  on  profit  dist ribution
3,  special  benefits,  costs  not 
connected with firm’s commercial activities and possible hidden profit distribution 
(e.g. payments to residents of low tax rate territories (so-called off-shore regions), 
gifts). In practical terms the taxation of firm’s profit was postponed to the moment 
when profit is distributed to owners. This means that amount of income tax paid by 
firm and tax income earned by state are dependent on the dividend decisions made 
on firm level. Although the share of direct taxes (especially corporate income tax) is 
low in Estonian state budget, previous discussion outlined the necessity to know 
which factors influence firms’ profit distribution decisions. It is easier for govern-
ment to compose both, positive and negative supplementary budgets, in case firms’ 
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payout  patterns  are  known.  As  supplementary  budgets  are  mainly  common  to 
economic recession, then current article focuses on years 2008-2009, when Estonia 
as  the  whole  world  witnessed  one  of  the  most  extensive  crisis  since  Great 
Depression.  
 
The objective of current paper is to search connection between firms’ payouts to 
owners and changes in firms’ financial indicators during financial crisis (i.e. years 
2008 and 2009). Financial indicators are chosen as determinants of payouts as other 
determinants (e.g. motives of owners) cannot be detected indirectly (see discussion 
in  next  section).  The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Firstly,  based  on  relevant 
literature an overview will be given of major aspects and factors that firms take into 
account when designing their dividend policy
4. Separate attention will be drawn to 
suggestions in previous literature, which could be applied in case of Estonian 
income tax system peculiarities. This is followed by empirical analysis, which 
includes description of data and study design succeeded by major results from study 
and their discussion. The paper ends with conclusion part.  
 
1. A theoretical overview of factors influencing corporate dividend policy 
 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that in the absence of any market imperfections 
and frictions, dividend policy is irrelevant. However, in reality those conditions are 
not  fulfilled.  The  three  most  common  market  imperfections  that  have  been 
investigated in conjunction with corporate dividend policy are: taxes, asymmetric 
information and agency costs.  
 
Differential tax treatment of dividends and capital gains is one of the reasons why 
companies may prefer to pay (or not to pay) cash dividends. Brennan (1970) was 
among  first  scholars  to  present  a  model  of  optimal  dividend  policy  under  tax 
differential between dividends and capital gains. Different tax treatment of various 
types of investors creates so-called tax clientele effects (see e.g. Elton and Gruber 
1970, Kalay 1982), which also impacts the dividend policy. 
 
Asymmetric information is the second common market imperfection. It has been 
argued that companies use dividend policy to convey private information about the 
firm’s  future  prospects  to  the  market  (see  e.g.  Miller  and  Rock  1985,  John  and 
Williams 1985). A recent study in London Stock Exchange showed that dividends 
have less information content than earnings in periods of growth and stability, but 
more in periods of economic adversity (Bozos et al. 2011). 
 
Agency costs arising due to the conflict of interest between different claimholders 
represents the third commonly cited market imperfection. There are many different 
explanations how  agency  costs affect  dividend  policy.  For  example,  Easterbrook 
(1984)  argues  that  companies  pay  dividends  to  overcome  the  agency  problem 
stemming from the separation of ownership and control. Jensen (1986) stated that 
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cash dividends help to reduce potential overinvestment problem in companies. Debt 
covenants that are written to reduce the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
bondholders may also dictate dividend policy of company (Smith and Warner 1979).  
 
While  transaction  and  flotation  costs  also  represent  one  type  of  market 
imperfections,  there  are  practically  no  papers  that  apply  only  these  as  the  main 
factors influencing dividends policy. Other explanations why firms pay dividends 
include  behavioral  explanations,  the  firm  life-cycle  theory  of  dividends,  and  the 
catering theory of dividends (Baker et al. 2011).  
 
Several papers have focused on the behavioral aspects to explain why companies 
pay dividends. It has been argued that dividends help investors to retain self-control 
in consumption decisions (Shefrin and Statman 1984). Also, several other behavioral 
explanations (e.g. involving habits, bounded rationality) have been proposed (see 
Frankfurter and Lane 1992). 
 
The firm life-cycle theory of dividends contends that the pattern of cash dividends 
changes over a firm’s life cycle (Mueller 1972). Young firms rarely pay dividends, 
while  mature  firms usually distribute some if not all of their  free cash  flows to 
investors. Empirical research usually confirmed the existence of such pattern (see 
e.g. Fama and French 2001, DeAngelo et al. 2006). 
 
The  catering  theory  of  dividends  (see  Baker  and  Wurgler  2004)  stresses  the 
importance of investor sentiment in dividend policy decisions, i.e. companies adjust 
their dividend policy according to whether shares of existing dividend-paying firms 
are trading at a premium or discount relative to those of non-dividend-paying firms.  
 
The empirical evidence is generally rather mixed (see e.g. Frankfurter and Wood 
2002,  Allen  and  Michaely  2003)  and  none  of  the  dividend  theories  has  been 
unequivocally  verified.  In  studying  dividend  policy  empirically,  researches  rely 
mainly on two approaches (Weigand and Baker 2009): 
  Statistical analysis of published financial data, 
  Survey methodology (interviews and questionnaires)
5. 
 
A typical list of key determinants that influence dividend policy based on empirical 
studies includes for instance the level of current and expected earnings, stability of 
earnings, availability of cash, investment opportunities, the ability to refinance debt, 
pattern of past dividends. However, dividend policy is also sensitive to such factors 
as corporate governance or legal environment (Baker et al. 2011).  
 
This last argument suggests that there is a need to study dividend policy of Estonian 
companies on both theoretical and empirical level due to Estonia’s unique corporate 
income tax system. Hazak (2007) constructed a theoretical model of a  company 
operating  under  uncertainty  in  a  binomial  framework  and  argued  that  if  the 
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probability  of  losses  is  zero,  it  is  optimal  under  distributed  profit  taxation  to 
distribute profit when earned equally to or less than investor’s consumption level. 
However,  if  the  probability  of  losses  is  noticeable,  the  company  value  for  the 
investor  is  maximized  if  profit  is  fully  distributed  when  earned.  This  actually 
suggests that during the financial crises, when the probability of losses increases, the 
dividend payout ratio should rise. While it is well known that managers are reluctant 
to reduce dividend payments, there is some empirical evidence that this reluctance 
will drop when facing financial distress (DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1990). 
 
2. Empirical analysis of the connection between payout policy and financial 
indicators in Estonian firms 
2.1. Data for analysis and study design 
 
For conducting current analysis, financial data of firms from Estonian Commercial 
Register (ECR) has been applied. Based on EMTAK 2008
6, the largest 14 industries 
have been chosen for analysis, which are:  agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining 
and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 
water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; construction; 
wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; transportation 
and  storage;  accommodation  and  food  service  activities;  information  and 
communication; financial and insurance activities; real estate activities; professional, 
scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service activities . The 
analysis  does  not  include  the  following  industries:  public  administration  and 
defense;  compulsory  social  security;  education; huma n  health  and  social  work 
activities; arts, entertainment and recreation; other service activities; activities of 
households as employers, undifferentiated goods and services producing activities of 
households for own use; activities of extraterritorial org anizations and bodies. The 
excluded industries do not play an important role in Estonian economics (as share 
from GDP) and the number of firms in those sectors is also relatively low. 
 
The analysis includes firms that have submitted financial reporting to  ECR. In total 
there are 301 869 observations in analysis, i.e. this is the amount of financial year 
reports submitted to ECR in period from 2006 to 2009
7. The number of firms in 
analysis differs through years, as new firms have been created in the viewed period. 
The number of firms has increased by 79% from 2005 to 2009. The initial dataset is 
limited to firms being economically active, which is achieved by excluding all cases 
where sales revenue equals zero in specific year. The selection of economically 
active firms narrows database to 202 057 observations. Such limitation is necessary, 
as the inclusion of economically inactive firms can bring to serious faults and 
anomalies. 
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As the next step it is important to create a framework for grouping firms, as the 
theoretical  overview  revealed  that  firms  with  varying  financial  health  should  be 
treated differently. The easiest way would be to divide firms to two groups based on 
the threat of distress. A limitation for such action is that in the circumstances of 
recession financial indicators of most firms in some specific sector might worsen, so 
it is necessary to distinguish between those, which perform worse than sector and 
those  which  do  not.  This  will  lead  to  creating  three  distinct  groups  outlined  as 
follows: 
1)  Firms, in case of which financial situation in specific year declined more than 
the average decline of industry for the same year (i.e. Group I). 
2)  Firms, in case of which financial situation in specific year declined, but less 
than the average decline of industry for the same year (i.e. Group II). 
3)  Firms, in case of which financial situation improved compared to previous year 
(i.e. Group III).  
 
Analysis  is  followed  by  creating  an  algorithm  to  divide  firms  to  three  groups 
outlined previously. As there is no single financial indicator available to achieve 
this, then some complex framework should be chosen. A traditional instrument to 
check  deterioration  in  firm’s  performance  is  bankruptcy  model,  but  as  it  is  not 
possible  to  determine  the  reliability  of  specific  models,  then  it  is  reasonable  to 
conduct grouping based on several models. Because of that, different bankruptcy 
models  will  be  applied  to  find  out  whether  firm’s  performance  has  deteriorated 
compared to previous year. The choice of models is based on several considerations. 
Firstly, model should be Estonia-specific or cited in literature. Secondly, data should 
be available to calculate model variables. Because of previously given aspects the 
analysis is limited to the usage of following bankruptcy models: 
1)  Discriminant model of Estonian firms (Lukason 2006: 56). 
2)  Logit-model of Estonian firms (Lukason 2006: 58). 
3)  Discriminant model (Z-Score) of USA firms (Altman 1968: 594). 
4)  Discriminant model of Finnish firms (Laitinen and Kankanpää 1999: 90). 
5)  Logit model of Polish firms (Ciesielski et al. 2005: 4). 
 
The grouping was conducted according to following logic. For all firms in analysis 
five  bankruptcy  scores  were  calculated  for  each  year,  which  was  followed  by 
calculating the same scores for industries. Bankruptcy scores for specific year were 
compared with that for previous year and in case at least three bankruptcy scores 
indicated an improvement in financial situation, then firm was attributed to Group 
III.  In  case  at  least  three  scores  indicated  deterioration  in  results,  then  it  was 
additionally studied, whether the deterioration was less or more than for industry, 
which in turn determined the final group membership (Group I or Group II). Derived 
from  the  grouping  algorithm  each  firm  could  be  in  different  groups  in  different 
years.  
 
As  digital  information  about  payouts  is  not  available  through  ECR,  then  for 
determining firm payout amounts the following two algorithms have been created by 
authors. As payout, authors consider declared dividends and share capital reduction 252 
(i.e. results of Equation 2 are deducted from results of Equation 1). The equation for 
dividends was the following: 
(Eq. 1) dividends = (retained earningst-1 + net incomet-1) – retained earningst  
 
In  the  profit  distribution  proposal  firms  can  decide  to  use  profit  for  different 
purposes.  For  instance  it  is  possible  to  increase  share  capital,  increase  reserve 
capital, increase other reserves, buy back own shares, initiate stock dividend issue, 
cover losses of previous years.  It is not possible to determine  buy back of own 
shares and stock dividend issue based on available data (balance sheet and income 
statement  variables).  At  the  same  time  it  is  possible  to  check  increase  of  share 
capital and reserves. Derived from previous, following restrictions are applied to 
Equation 1: 
  In case firm’s share capital increased compared to previous year, then given 
positive change will be deducted from the sum of dividends; 
  In case firm’s compulsory and other reserves increased compared to previous 
year, then given positive change will be deducted from the sum of dividends; 
  Negative and very small dividends will be eliminated from dataset. 
 
To find out reduction in share capital or reserves, the following equation will be 
used:  
(Eq. 2) reduction of share capital and reserves = (share capitalt – share capitalt-1) + 
(total reservest – total reservest-1) 
 
The reduction of share capital and reserves takes place on following conditions: 
  Negative change of share capital means its reduction, positive change increase; 
  Negative change of reserves means its reduction, positive change increase; 
  The  sum  of  retained  earnings  and  net  income  should  be  more  than  zero, 
otherwise reduction of share capital is not possible, as firm’s equity would not 
be in accordance with Estonian laws.  
 
Beside  the  value  of  payout,  payout  ratios (PR)  will  be used,  which  indicate the 
proportion of earnings paid out to shareholders as dividends. It is usually calculated 







There are two aspects which should be kept in mind when interpreting the numerical 
value of the payout ratio calculated by using Equation 3. Firstly, companies can 
make cash payments to shareholders also in other forms beside cash dividends (like 
share repurchases or payments associated with share capital reductions). Secondly, 
dividends  can  be  paid  out  also  from  the  retained  earnings  of  previous  years. 
Therefore in some cases payout ratio can exceed 100% (e.g. company distributes all 
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its net income from last year plus some proportion of its retained earnings from 
previous years), and in some cases the value of payout ratio can also be negative 
even though company pays dividends (e.g. company earned a loss in the last year, 
but  paid  out  some  dividends  using  retained  earnings  from  the  previous  years). 
Usually the value of payout ratio remains between 0% and 100%. 
 
Derived  from  the  objective  of  paper,  changes  in  financial  indicators  will  be 
compared  with  payout  and  payout  ratio.  The  relationship  will  be  tested  with 
different time lags – relationship between period t payouts and payout ratios with 
period t-1, period t and period t+1 financial indicators. The method for determining 
relationship is correlation analysis (with Pearson formula). The financial indicators 
(independent variables) used in correlation analysis have been chosen based on their 
usage in literature and possible connection with payout and payout ratio. Namely, 
they are (i.e. Indicators): 
  Change in debt to asset ratio (i.e. ∆DA); 
  Change in business profit
9 and sales ratio (i.e. ∆BS); 
  Change in net profit and sales ratio (i.e. ∆NS); 
  Change in current assets and current liabilities ratio (i.e. ∆CAL); 
  Change in sales (i.e. ∆S); 
  Change in business profit (i.e. ∆BP); 
  Change in net profit (i.e. ∆NI). 
 
Change will be calculated as  , where Valuen denotes the value of 
specific variable or ratio for the viewed year and Valuen-1 for the year before viewed 
year. The usage of absolute value (i.e.  ) in denominator is necessary, as 
some financial data can have negative values and this could lead to misinterpretation 
of changes. The usage of changes has several reasons. Values from balance sheet 
and income statement, but also financial ratios are static figures and they do not 
reflect changes in firm’s performance. Secondly, in case of value changes it can be 
noted, whether the situation has improved or not, whereas in case of balance sheet 
and income statement variables or financial ratios it is not possible to do it without 
comparison to some base figure. Moreover, there are no uniform concepts available, 
what certain values of financial statement variables or ratios should signal. 
 
2.2. Results of analysis and discussion 
 
The  analysis is  followed  with  three  Groups outlined  in  previous chapter  and  all 
results have also been summarized in Table 1. Firstly, Group I is analyzed, in case of 
which economic situation declined more than the average decline of industry. First 
sample includes 2377 firms which made payouts in year 2008. Year 2008 payouts 
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have  no  statistically  significant  relationship  with  year  2007  and  year  2008 
Indicators. At the same time there are several statistically significant relationships 
between  year  2009  payout  or  payout  ratio  and  Indicators.  Namely,  payouts  are 
related to ∆S, ∆BP and ∆NI, whereas all relationships are positive. The strongest is 
the relationship between payouts and business profit change. The same indicators 
have  also  statistically  significant  relationship  with  payout  ratio,  whereas  all 
relationships are  remarkably  stronger,  being  twice  as strong  as  for  payouts.  The 
analysis was followed by studying the firms that made payouts in year 2009 (second 
sample of 2849 firms), but there was no statistically significant relationship between 
year 2008 payouts or payout ratios and year 2009 Indicators. This follows the same 
tendency as for firstly analyzed year 2008 payouts, but at the time of conducting the 
analysis  authors  did  not  have  data  to  check  the  relationship  between  year  2009 
payouts or payout ratios and year 2010 financial indicators. 
 
Secondly, Group II is analyzed, in case of which economic situation declined, but 
less than the average decline of industry. As for previous group, the first sample 
consists  of  firms  making  payouts  in  2008  (695  firms).  Year  2007  and  2008 
Indicators have only one statistically significant positive relationship with year 2008 
payouts or payout ratios, being between year 2008 ∆DA and year 2008 payout, but 
the  relationship  is  not  strong.  As  with  Group  I,  several  statistically  significant 
relationships  are  detected  with  year  2009  Indicators.  Firstly,  payout  ratios  are 
positively related to ∆DA, but the relationship is very low. There are two strong 
negative relationships between year 2009 Indicators (∆NS, ∆NI) and payout ratios of 
year 2008. It can be concluded that decrease in profitability results in the increase of 
payouts (or at least their preservation on the same level), i.e. for this group of firms 
payout  policy  remains  unchanged  or  changes  positively  during  financial  crisis. 
When using year 2009 payouts (853 firms), then the only result is weak positive 
relationship between year 2009 payout ratio and year 2008 ∆NI. 
 
Thirdly,  Group  III  is  analyzed,  in  case  of  which  economic  situation  improved 
compared to previous year. There are 2616 firms, which made payouts in year 2008 
in Group III. Following the pattern of Group I, there are no statistically significant 
relationships between year 2008 payouts or payout ratios and Indicators. Exactly as 
for Group I, there are positive relationships between ∆S, ∆BP and ∆NI from year 
2009 and year 2008 payouts. Still, those relationships are very weak. Similarly to 
Group II, the only statistically significant negative relationship is between year 2009 
∆NI  and  year  2008  payout  ratio,  but  it  is  not  strong.  What  concerns  year  2009 
payouts and payout ratios, then there are no statistically significant relationships 
with Indicators from years 2007-2009. 
 
The empirical analysis conducted by authors indicates that Estonian companies did 
not rely on past values of this specific set of financial indicators when making their 
payout decisions. This result contradicts with previous empirical studies that applied 
the data of Estonian largest companies (e.g. Sander and Trumm 2006). 
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Table 1. Significant variables and correlation coefficients from analysis (sig. = 0.05) 
Firm group  Year 2008  Year 2009 
Indicator year
10  Payouts  Payout ratios  Payouts  Payout ratios 
I         
2006/2007  -  -     
2007/2008  -  -  -  - 
2008/2009 
∆S (0.230), ∆BP 
(0.348), ∆NI 
(0.300) 
∆S (0.573), ∆BP 
(0.849), ∆NI 
(0.729) 
-  - 
II         
2006/2007  -  -     
2007/2008  ∆DA (0.171)  -  -  ∆NI (0.128) 
2008/2009  ∆DA (0.079)  ∆NS (-0.795), 
∆NI (-0.808)  -  - 
III         
2006/2007  -  -     
2007/2008  -  -  -  - 
2008/2009 
∆S (0.095), ∆BP 
(0.098), ∆NI 
(0.089) 
∆NI (-0.186)  -  - 




Figure 1. Distribution of Estonian public companies according to the number of 
shareholders (Eesti Väärtpaberite Keskregistri Statistika – Investor ja Ettev￵tja, 
Sügis 2004). 
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There could be several reasons why past values of financial indicators turned out to 
be not important. First, our sample mainly consisted of micro companies (83-92% of 
all companies in our sample). It has been argued (Syrjä et al.: 2011: 633) that the 
managers  and  owners  of  small  companies  do  not  conduct  in-depth  long-term 
financial planning in their firms. In such companies payout decisions are irregular 
and mainly driven by the owners’ need for money. Surveys conducted in Estonia 
(Sander and Trumm 2006, Kaarna et al. 2010) suggest that most important factor 
influencing  dividend decision  is  the  cash  need  of  (controlling) shareholders. For 
instance in Canada, firms tailor their dividend policy to meet the preferences of 
controlling shareholder (Baker et al. 2011). Similar behavior can also be observed in 
other countries. In Estonia, a company can pay out dividends only if the majority of 
votes at the general shareholder meeting support it. Therefore the dividend policy is 
essentially  under  the  control  of  controlling  shareholder.  Since  most  Estonian 
companies have only one or two shareholders (see Fig. 1), any model or analysis 
that  relies only  on  company  level  data and  does not  take  into  account  different 
characteristics of owners cannot provide comprehensive explanation to the observed 
patterns in dividends. 
 
Second reason for the lack of connection between firm’s past financial performance 
and payout decisions could be the specific nature of our sample period. During the 
crisis the financial health and main financial indicators of the company could change 
very quickly, even during a couple of months. In such an environment, decisions 
based on outdated data can easily lead company to bankruptcy. In practice, dividend 
decisions are usually made 4-6 month after the end of financial year. At that time the 
company may already know the financial results of the first half-year and therefore it 
is  logical  that  available new  information  will  be  taken  into  account.  Our  results 
confirmed that companies rely on the expected future earnings when making payout 
decisions (as was indicated also in the theoretical part of the paper). However, for 
different groups the relationship between dividends and next year’s net profit was 
different. In case of Group I, which included companies that relatively suffered the 
most due to crisis, there is semi-strong positive relationship between dividends and 
next year’s net profit, which indicates that in this group dividends are mainly paid 
by companies which financial health was expected to get better. This result casts 
some  doubts  on  the  theoretical  proposition  made  by  Hazak  (2007)  about  the 
relationship between the dividends and the expected probability of loss. However, 
our  analysis  was  not  specifically  designed  to  test  such  proposition  and  the  next 
year’s loss/profit may not be the best indicator for the expected probability of loss. 
In  case  of  other  groups the  relationships between  dividends and  next  year’s  net 
profit  were  either  weaker  (while  still  statistically  significant)  or  absent.  It  is 
important to notice, that due to the specific features of corporate income taxation 
system in Estonia, distribution of dividends affects negatively the next period’s net 
profit,  i.e.  if  company  decides  to  pay  out  dividends  this  occurs  during  the  next 
financial year and the taxes associated with the dividends reduce the net profit of 
that year. This fact actually increases the predictive power of dividends. It is also 
interesting  to  note  that  for  Group  II,  which  included  companies  with  less 
deteriorated financial health, the relationship between payout ratio and next year’s 257 
profit figures was strongly negative. The authors are not able to offer conclusive 
explanation for such result based on current analysis. 
 
Nissim and Ziv (2001) found that dividend changes are positively related to changes 
in earnings in each of the two years after the dividend change. Dividends’ predictive 
power has been documented also in a few other papers (see e.g. Anderson 2011). 
However, there is considerable number of empirical papers confirming the opposite 
(see e.g. Grullon et al. 2003, DeAngelo et al. 1996, Benartzi et al. 1997, Lie 2004). 
In overall, our results show that dividends are connected with the future earnings of 
the company, although the relationship was not present for all years and types of 
firms. Our results still indicate that dividends could be used for predicting future 
earnings.  
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
Current  study  focused  on  the  connection  between  firm’s  financial  performance 
indicators  and  payout  policy  on  the  example  of  all  Estonian  firms.  Correlation 
analysis  between  different  changes  in  financial  indicators  and  firm’s  payout 
indicators  (payout  amount  and  payout  ratio)  was  conducted  in  a  way  that 
relationship was sought between previous, same and next year financial performance 
indicators and payout indicators. For the analysis firms were grouped to different 
subsets  dependent  on  their  financial  health  changes calculated  using  the  help  of 
bankruptcy  models.  Results  indicate  that  mostly  there  is  connection  between 
changes of next  year’s financial performance indicators and payout indicators of 
current year. Namely, dependent on viewed year, changes in different profit levels, 
sales and capital structure were found to be statistically significant variables. 
 
The results of current study casted some doubt whether increase in probability of 
loss (measured in our study by using different bankruptcy models) will indeed lead 
to larger payouts to shareholders. However since the probability of loss cannot be 
directly  measured, the choice of proxies could heavily influence the results, and 
therefore a need for future research exists in this avenue. 
 
Current study presents some important implications for state budget composition. 
Firstly, most connections in current study were found to be between certain year 
payouts and next year’s financial results, i.e. firms’ financial information from past 
years  cannot  be  applied  during  state  budget  composition  to  forecast  corporate 
income tax. Secondly, most of the connections found are not strong and to some 
extent unexplainable or controversial with previous theoretical findings, which also 
reduces their applicability. 
 
Our suggestion for future research would be the inclusion of characteristics of major 
shareholders into the analysis of corporate dividend decisions. As dividend policy is 
under  the  control  of  major  shareholder,  his  decisions  are  more  important  in 
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